This paper discusses two sources of ideas that influence monetary policy makers today. The first is a set of analytical results that impose the rational expectations equilibrium concept and do 'intelligent design' by solving Ramsey and mechanism design problems. The second is the adaptive learning process that first taught us how to anchor the price level with a gold standard, then how to replace the gold standard with a fiat currency wanting nominal anchors. Models of out-of-equilibrium learning say that such an adaptive evolutionary process will converge to a self-confirming equilibrium (SCE). In an SCE, a government's probability model is correct about events that occur under the prevailing government policy, but possibly wrong about the consequences of other policies. That causes mistakes absent from a rational expectations equilibrium and expands the role of learning.
Introduction
The introduction of the precious metals for the purposes of money may with truth be considered as one of the most important steps towards the improvement of commerce, and the arts of civilised life; but it is no less true that, with the advancement of knowledge and science, we discover that it would be another improvement to banish them again from the employment to which, during a less enlightened period, they had been so advantageously applied. Ricardo (1816, p. 65) This essay is about ideas and experiences that shaped Ricardo's proposal, and ideas and experiences that emerged from the struggles of academic economists and policy makers to implement and refine what they had learned from Ricardo and his followers. I focus on two important sources of prevailing ideas in macroeconomics. One is a collection of powerful theoretical results and empirical methods described in sections 2, 3, and 4 that apply the rational expectations equilibrium concept to estimate models and design optimal macroeconomic policies intelligently. The other is an adaptive evolutionary process, modelled in section 5 and illustrated both in section 6, about ideas and events that influenced Ricardo, and in section 7, about struggles of the U.S. monetary authorities in the 1970s to realize the promise for improvement held out by Ricardo.
The rational expectations equilibrium concept equates all subjective distributions with an objective distribution. It is useful to distinguish the step of equating all subjective distributions from the step of equating subjective distributions to the objective distribution that actually governs outcomes. By equating subjective distributions for endogenous variables to an equilibrium distribution implied by a model, the rational expectations hypothesis makes agents' beliefs disappear as extra components of a theory and sets up the powerful theoretical results and intelligent policy design exercises described in section 2. Section 3 describes theoretical and practical reasons for equating subjective distributions to an objective one and how that facilitates the rational expectations econometrics described in section 4.
The assumption that agents share common beliefs underpins influential doctrines about whether observed inflation-unemployment dynamics can be exploited by policy makers, the time inconsistency of benevolent government policy, the capacity of reputation to substitute for commitment, the incentives for one type of policy maker to emulate another, and the wisdom of making information public. The common beliefs assumption is especially stressed in those modern theories of optimal macroeconomic policy that focus on how a benevolent government optimally shapes expectations. This intelligent design approach to macroeconomic policy perfects an older econometric policy evaluation method that Lucas (1976) criticized because it imputed different beliefs to the government and other agents.
Intelligent design is normative ('what should be') economics, but when it influences policy makers, it becomes positive ('what is') economics. Some researchers in the intelligent design tradition ignore the distinction between positive and normative economics from the start.
Thus, a standard tool for understanding observed time series properties of government debt and taxes is to apply a normative analysis, e.g., Barro (1979) , Lucas and Stokey (1983) , and Aiyagari et al. (2002) . It is also true that some policy advisors have enough faith that evolution produces good outcomes to recommend copying best practices (for example, see Keynes (1913) ). If only good things survive the tests of time and practice, evolution produces intelligent design.
Theories of out-of-equilibrium learning tell us not always to expect that. An observational equivalence possibility emerges from the rational expectations econometrics of section 4 and sets the stage for section 5, which describes how a system of adaptive agents converges to a self-confirming equilibrium in which all agents have correct forecasting distributions for events observed often along an equilibrium path, but possibly mistaken views about policies and outcomes paths that are rarely observed. This matters because intelligent design of rational expectations equilibria hinges on knowing and manipulating expectations about events that will not be observed. Self-confirming equilibria allow models to survive that imply mistaken policies even though they match historical data. Section 6 mentions examples from a millenium of monetary history that culminated in the ideas contained in the quote from Ricardo. To tell some stories about the emergence of U.S. inflation in the 1970s and its conquest under Volcker and Greenspan, section 7 uses adaptive models in which the government solves intelligent design problems using probability models that are misspecified, either permanently or temporarily. While these stories differ in many interesting details, they all say that choices of the monetary authorities were affected by misunderstandings that do not occur within a rational expectations equilibrium.
1 These misspecification stories also provide a backhanded defense for inflation targeting.
Intelligent design with common beliefs
What I call intelligent design is to solve Pareto problem in which a planner and all agents optimize in light of information and incentive constraints and a common probability model.
Intelligent design is a coherent response to Lucas's (1976) indictment of pre-rational expectations macroeconomic policy design procedures. Lucas accused those procedures of incorporating private agents' decision rules that were not best responses to government policy under an equilibrium probability measure. The cross-equation restrictions of common belief models fix that problem.
I use f to denote a probability density and x t to denote a history x t , x t−1 , . . . , x 0 . Partition
, where v t is a vector of decisions taken by a government and y t is a vector of all other variables. Let f (y ∞ , v ∞ |ρ) be a joint density conditional on a parameter vector ρ ∈ Ω ρ . Government chooses a sequence h of functions
to maximize a Pareto criterion that can be expressed as expected utility under density f (x ∞ |ρ):
Modern intelligent design in macroeconomics solves government programming problems (2) with models f that impute common beliefs and best responses to all of the agents who inhabit the model. The common beliefs assumption used to construct the macroeconomic model makes parameters describing agents' beliefs about endogenous variables disappear from ρ.
The common beliefs assumption underlies a long list of useful results in modern macroeconomics. The following four have especially influenced thinking within central banks.
1. Expected versus unexpected government actions. Lucas (1972b) drew a sharp distinction between the effects of foreseen and unforeseen monetary and fiscal policy actions when the government and the public share a probability model. That idea defines the terms in which central bankers now think about shocks and systematic policies.
Optimal fiscal and monetary policy cast as Ramsey and mechanism design problems.
A literature summarized and extended by King and Wolman (1996) , Clarida et al. (1999) , and Woodford (2003) uses dynamic macroeconomic models with sticky prices to design monetary policy rules by solving Ramsey plans like (2) and finding practical ways to represent and implement them. New dynamic models of public finance refine Ramsey plans by focusing on a tradeoff between efficiency and incentives that emerges from the assumption that each individual privately observes his own skills and effort, a feature that imposes constraints on the allocations that a planner can implement relative to ones he could achieve if he had more information. 3. Time consistency. The availability of the rational expectations equilibrium concept enabled Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978) to explain how alternative timing protocols affect a benevolent government's capacity to manipulate and then 2 See for example Golosov et al. (2003) , Kocherlakota (2005) , and Golosov et al. (2007) .
confirm prior expectations about its actions.
3 The time consistency 'problem' is the observation that equilibrium outcomes in a representative-agent economy depend on the timing protocol for decision making that nature or the modeler imposes. Better outcomes emerge if a government chooses a history-contingent plan once-and-for-all at time 0 than if it chooses sequentially. By choosing future actions at time 0, the government can take into account how expectations about its actions at times t > 0 influence private agents' actions at all dates between 0 and t. A government must ignore those beneficial expectations effects if it is forced to choose sequentially.
Reputation can substitute for commitment.
Under rational expectations, a government strategy plays two roles, first, as a decision rule for the government and, second, as a system of private sector expectations about government actions that the government always wants to confirm. 4,5 A system of expectations is a history-dependent government strategy like (1). A credible public policy is an equilibrium system of expectations that gives a government incentives to confirm prior expectations about its future actions, actions to which to it cannot commit because it chooses sequentially.
6
3 While technical treatments of the time consistency problem rely heavily on the rational expectations equilibrium concept, all that is needed to spot the problem is that private agents care about future government actions. In a discussion on August 16, 1787 at the U.S. Constitutional Convention about whether the Federal government should be prohibited from issuing fiduciary currency, Gouverneur Morris, Oliver Ellsworth, and James Madison recognized a time consistency problem, while Edmund Randolph and George Mason raised doubts about tying the hands of the government by arguing that no one can foresee all contingencies. See Madison (1987, pp. 470-471) . 4 The theory is silent about who chooses an equilibrium system of beliefs, the government (after all, it is the government's decision rule) or the public (but then again, they are the private sector's expectations). This ambiguity and the multiplicity of equilibria make it difficult to use this theory to formulate advice to policy makers about actions that can help it to earn a good reputation. Instead, the theory is about how a government comes into a period confronting a set of private sector expectations about its actions that it will want to confirm. Blinder (1998, pp. 60-62) struggles with this issue when he describes pressures on the Fed not to disappoint the market. While Blinder's discussion can be phrased almost entirely within the rational expectations paradigm, the account by Bernanke (2007) of the problems the Fed experiences in anchoring private sector expectations cannot. Bernanke argues in terms of objects outside a rational expectations equilibrium.
5 The theory of credible public policy seems to explain why some policy makers who surely knew about better decision rules chose to administer ones supporting bad outcomes. Chari et al. (1998) and Albanesi et al. (2002) interpret the big inflation of the 1970s and its stabilization in the 1980s in terms of the actions of benevolent and knowledgeable policy makers who were trapped by the public's expectations about what it would do.
6 See the credible public policy models of Stokey (1989 Stokey ( , 1991 and Chari and Kehoe (1993b,a) . By making
There are multiple equilibrium strategies, i.e., multiple systems of common expectations that a government would want to confirm, with incentive constraints linking good and bad equilibria.
These theoretical rational expectations results have influenced the way monetary policy is now discussed within central banks. Because central banks want to implement solutions of Ramsey problems like (2) in contexts like (1) in which the distinction between the effects of foreseen and unforeseen policy actions is important, a time consistency problem like (3) arises, prompting them to focus on ways like (4) to sustain good reputations.
7
3 Justifications for equating objective and subjective distributions These and many other theoretical results hinge on the part of the rational expectations equilibrium concept that equates subjective distributions for endogenous variables to an equilibrium distribution. To gain empirical content, rational expectations models also takes the logically distinct step of equating the equilibrium distribution to the data generating distribution. I shall use asset pricing theory to illustrate two justifications for taking that step, one based on an argument that agents with beliefs closer to the truth will eliminate others, another on empirical convenience. Hansen and Singleton (1983) and many others have generated restrictions on the covariation of consumption and a one-period return R j,t+1 (x t+1 ) on asset j by starting with consumer i's Euler equation
an intrinsically 'forward-looking' variable, a promised discounted value for the representative household, also be a 'backward-looking' state variable that encodes history, Abreu et al. (1986 Abreu et al. ( , 1990 ) tie past and future together in a subtle way that exploits the common beliefs equilibrium concept. For some applications, see Chang (1998) , Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) , and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, ch. 22) . 7 See Blinder (1998) and Bernanke et al. (2001) .
is consumer i's subjective one-step-ahead transition density for a state vector x t+1 that determines both returns and time t + 1 consumption, c i,t+1 , β is a discount factor common across i, and u i (c i,t+1 (x t+1 )) is consumer i's marginal utility of consumption. Here θ i is a parameter vector indexing consumer i's subjective density.
Complete markets and survival
In a finite-horizon setting, Harrison and Kreps (1979) showed that when there are complete markets, the stochastic discount factor
is unique. Here f (x t+1 |x t ) ≡ f (x t+1 |x t , ρ) is a common physical conditional density. Because offsetting differences in marginal utility functions and probabilities leave the left side of (4) fixed, the uniqueness of the stochastic discount factor allows different densities f i .
Suppose that density f actually governs outcomes. 8 Blume and Easley (2006) showed that in complete markets economies with Pareto optimal allocations and an infinite horizon, the f i (x ∞ )'s of agents who have positive wealth in the limit merge to the density that is closest to the truth f (x ∞ ). 9 Merging means that the densities agree about tail events. 10 If
for some i, then for an infinite horizon complete markets economy with a Pareto optimal allocation, this survival result implies the rational expectations assumption, provided that agents have access to an infinite history of observations at time 0.
8 I allow f i (x t |θ i ) and f (x t |ρ) to have different parameterizations partly to set the stage for subsection 4.1 and section 5.
9 Closest as measured by Kullback and Leibler's relative entropy. 10 In the context of a complete markets economy with a Lucas tree, Sandroni (2000) argued that a disagreement about tail events would present some consumers with arbitrage opportunities that cannot exist in equilibrium. Grossman and Shiller (1981) , Hansen and Singleton (1983) , and Hansen and Richard (1987) wanted an econometric framework to apply to incomplete markets where Blume and Easley's complete markets survival argument doesn't apply.
Incomplete markets

11
Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Hansen and Richard (1987) simply imposed rational expectations and made enough stationarity assumptions to validate a Law of Large Numbers that gives GMM or maximum likelihood estimators good asymptotic properties. Under the rational expectations assumption, (3) imposes testable restrictions on the empirical joint distribution of returns and either individual or aggregate consumption.
An empirical reason to allow belief heterogeneity
Many have followed Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Hansen and Richard (1987) by imposing rational expectations, letting u(c) =
, and defining the stochastic discount factor as the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution
The aggregate consumption data have mistreated (5) and
One reaction has been to stick to rational expectations but to add backward-looking (see Campbell and Cochrane (1999) ) or forward-looking (see Epstein and Zin (1989) ) contribu-
11 It is empirically difficult to distinguish a diversity of beliefs that is inspired by differences among models f i (x t ) from one that is generated by different information evaluated with a common probability model. Under a common probability model but differing information sets, Grossman and Shiller (1982) obtain an aggregation of beliefs under incomplete markets in a continuous time setting with a single consumption good. When the value of a continuously and costlessly traded asset i and also all individuals' consumption flows are diffusions, Grossman and Shiller show that the excess return on asset i is explained by its covariance with aggregate consumption, conditioned on any information set that is common to all investors. To get this result, Grossman and Shiller apply a law of iterated expectations with respect to a probability model that is common to all investors. tions to time t felicity. Another reaction has been to let disparate beliefs contribute to the stochastic discount factor. Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) opened the door to such an approach when they treated the stochastic discount factor m t+1 as an unknown nonnegative random variable and deduced what observed returns R j,t+1 and restriction (6) imply about the first and second moments of admissible stochastic discount factors (with incomplete markets, there exist multiple stochastic discount factors). Their idea was that before specifying a particular theory about the utility function and beliefs linking m to real variables like consumption, it is useful to characterize the mean and standard deviation that an empirically successful m must have. This approach leaves open the possibility that a successful theory of a stochastic discount factor will assign a role to a fluctuating probability ratio
even for an economy in which agent i is a single representative agent. The likelihood ratio
creates a wedge relative to the Euler equation that has usually been fit in the rational expectations macroeconomic tradition originating in Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Mehra and Prescott (1985) . Likelihood ratio wedge approaches have been investigated by Bossaerts (2002 Bossaerts ( , 2004 , Hansen (2007) , and Hansen and Sargent (2007) , among others. The art in Hansen (2007) is to extend rational expectations enough to understand the data better while also retaining the econometric discipline that rational expectations models acquire by economizing on free parameters that characterize agents' beliefs. 
Another empirical reason to allow belief heterogeneity
Applied macroeconomists know that data can be weakly informative about parameters and model features. Ultimately, this is why differences of opinion about how an economy works can persist. The philosophy of Anderson et al. (2003) , Hansen (2007) , and Hansen and Sargent (2007) is to let agents inside a model have views that can diverge from the truth in ways about which the data speak slowly and quietly.
Rational expectations econometrics
Ideas from rational expectations econometrics will help me to set the stage for some stories and models that feature gaps between an objective distribution and the temporary subjective distributions used by a government that solves a sequence of intelligent design problems. I review econometric methods that allow an outsider to learn about a rational expectations equilibrium and introduce some objects and possibilities that are in play in models containing agents who are learning an equilibrium.
A rational expectations equilibrium is a joint probability distribution f (x t |θ o ) over his- A rational expectations equilibrium evaluated at a particular history is a likelihood function:
The most confident and ambitious branch of rational expectations econometrics recommends maximizing a likelihood function or combining it with a Bayesian prior p(θ) to construct a posterior p(θ|x t ). 13 In choosing θ to maximize a likelihood function, a rational expectations 13 For early applications of this empirical approach, see Sargent (1977) , Sargent (1979) , Hansen and Sargent (1980) , Taylor (1980) , and Dagli and Taylor (1984) . econometrician in effect searches simultaneously for a stochastic process of exogenous variables and a system of expectations that prompts the forward-looking artificial agents inside the model to make decisions that best fit the data.
14 Taking logs in (7) gives
where (x t |x t−1 ; θ) = log f (x t |x t−1 ; θ). Define the score function as
The first-order conditions for maximum likelihood estimation are
By solving these equations, an econometrician finds a θ that allows him to approximate the equilibrium density very well as T → +∞.
4.1 Using a misspecified model to estimate a better one Lucas (1976) convinced us that non-structural models are bad vehicles for policy analysis.
But the first-order conditions for estimating a good fitting non-structural model can help to make good inferences about parameters of a structural economic model.
Indirect estimation assumes that a researcher wants to estimate a parameter vector ρ of a structural rational expectations model for which (1) analytical difficulties prevent directly evaluating a likelihood function f (x t |ρ), and (2) computational methods allow simulating time series from f (x t |ρ) at given vector ρ. See Gourieroux et al. (1993) , Smith (1993) , and Gallant and Tauchen (1996) . Indirect estimation carries along two models, a model of economic interest with an intractable likelihood function, and an auxiliary model with a tractable likelihood function that fits the historical data well. The parameters of the economist's model ρ are interpretable in terms of preferences, technologies, and information sets, while the parameters θ of the auxiliary model f (x t |θ) are data fitting devices. The idea of Gallant and Tauchen (1996) is first to estimate the auxiliary model by maximum likelihood, then to use the score functions for the auxiliary model and the first-order conditions (9) to define a criterion for a GMM estimator that can be used in conjunction with simulations of the economic model to estimate the parameters ρ. Thus, let the auxiliary model have a log likelihood function given by equation (8) and, for the data sample in hand, compute the maximum likelihood estimateθ. For different ρ's, simulate paths x τ (ρ) for τ = 0, . . . , t from the economic model. Think of using these artificial data to evaluate the score function for the auxiliary model s τ (x τ (ρ),θ) for each τ . Gallant and Tauchen estimate ρ by setting the average score for the auxiliary model
as close to zero as possible when measured by a quadratic form of the type used in GMM.
If the auxiliary model fits well, this method gives good estimates of the parameters ρ of the economic model. In particular, the indirect estimator is as efficient as maximum likelihood in the ideal case that the economic and auxiliary models are observationally equivalent. Data give the government no indication that it should abandon its model. Nevertheless, the government can make major policy design mistakes because its misunderstands the consequences of policies that it has not chosen. 16 The possibility that the government uses what, unbeknownst to it, is an auxiliary model, not a structural one, sets the stage for the self-confirming equilibria that play an important role in the adaptive learning models of the following section and in the stories to be told in sections 6 and 7.
A troublesome possibility
5 Adaptive learning models and their limiting outcomes Section 3 described Blume and Easley's demonstration that a survival argument for equating objective and subjective distributions falls short in many economies. This section takes up where that discussion left off by describing transient and limiting outcomes in models in which agents make decisions by using statistical models that at least temporarily are misspecified. I summarize findings from a literature that studies systems of agents who use forward-looking decision algorithms based on temporary models that they update using recursive least squares algorithms (see Marcet and Sargent (1989a) , Honkapohja (1999, 2001 ), Woodford (1990) , and Fudenberg and Levine (1998) ). 17 These adaptive systems can have limiting outcomes in which objective and subjective distributions are equal over frequently observed events, but not over rarely observed events. That causes problems for intelligent macroeconomic policy design. I shall use examples of such adaptive systems to tell some stories in section 7. It is useful to begin by defining population objects that suppose that agents have finished learning.
Self-confirming equilibrium
.
A true data generating process and an approximating model, respectively, are
17 Appendix A describes a related literature on learning in games.
A decision maker has preferences ordered by
and chooses a history-dependent plan
that maximizes (12). This gives rise to the sequence of decisions v(h|θ) ∞ . The difference between this choice problem and the canonical intelligent design problem in section 2 is the presence of the approximating model (12) rather than the true model that appeared in (2). I call maximizing (12) a "Phelps problem" in honor of a policy design problem that Phelps (1967) solved and that will play an important role in section 7.
Definition 5.1. A self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) is a parameter vector θ o for the approximating model that satisfies the data-matching conditions
An SCE builds in, first, optimization of (12) given beliefs indexed by θ o , and, second, a θ = θ o that satisfies the data matching conditions (14). Data matching prevails for events that occur under the equilibrium policy v(h|θ o ) ∞ , but it is possible that
In an SCE, the approximating model is observationally equivalent with the true model for events that occur under the SCE equilibrium government policy, but not necessarily under other government policies.
Learning converges to an SCE
An SCE is a possible limit point an adaptive learning process. Bray and Kreps (1987) distinguish between learning about an equilibrium and learning within an equilibrium.
18 By saying about and not within, Bray and Kreps emphasize that the challenge is to analyze how a system of agents can come to learn an endogenous objective distribution by using adaptive algorithms that do not simply apply Bayes' law to a correct probability model. 19 We cannot appeal to the same econometrics that lets a rational expectations econometrician learn an equilibrium because an econometrician is outside the model and his learning is a side-show that does not affect the data generating mechanism. It is different when the people learning about an equilibrium are inside the model. Their learning affects decisions and alters the distribution of endogenous variables over time, making them aim at moving targets.
Suppose that an adaptive learner begins with an initial estimateθ 0 at time 0 and uses a recursive least squares learning algorithm
As in the models of learning in games of Foster and Young (2003) and Young (2004, ch. 8), we assume that decision makers mistakenly regard their time t model indexed byθ t as permanent and form the sequence of decisions 20 18 A difficult challenge in the machine learning literature is to construct an adaptive algorithm that learns dynamic programming. For a recent significant advance based on the application of the adjoint of a resolvent operator and a law of large numbers, see Meyn (2007, ch. 11) .
19 Bray and Kreps's 'about' versus 'within' tension also pertains to Bayesian theories of convergence to Nash equilibria. Marimon (1997) said that a Bayesian knows the truth from the beginning. Young (2004) pointed out that the absolute continuity assumption underlying the beautiful convergence result of Kalai and Lehrer (1993, 1994) requires that players have substantial prior knowledge about their opponents' strategies. Young doubts that Kalai and Lehrer have answered the question ". . . can one identify priors [over opponents strategies] whose support is wide enough to capture the strategies that one's (rational) opponents are actually using, without assuming away the uncertainty inherent in the situation? " Young (2004, p. 95) 20 Cho and Kasa (2006) create a model structure closer to the vision of Foster and Young (2003) . In particular, Cho and Kasa's model has the following structure: (1) one or more decision makers take actions at time t by solving a dynamic programming problem based on a possibly misspecified time t model, (2) the actions of some of those decision makers influence the data-generating process; (3) a decision maker shows that he is aware of possible misspecifications of his model by trying to detect them with an econometric specification test, (4) if the specification test rejects the model, the decision maker selects an improved
where h t (x t |θ) is the same function (13) that solves the original Phelps problem (12) under the model f (y ∞ , v ∞ |θ). Under this scheme for making decisions, the joint density of (y
The learning literature states restrictions on the estimator e and the densities f (·|θ) and
where convergence can be either almost surely or in distribution, depending on details of the estimator e in (16). 
Uses of adaptive learning models in macroeconomics
One important use of adaptive models in macroeconomics has been to select among multiple rational expectations equilibria (see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for many useful examples). Another has been to choose among alternative representations of policy rules from Ramsey problems, a subset of which are stable under adaptive learning (see Evans and Honkapohja (2003) ). Another has been to improve the fits of models of asset pricing and big inflations by positing gaps between the objective density and asset holders' subjective densities (e.g., Adam et al. (2006) and Marcet and Nicolini (2003) ). In the remainder of this paper, I focus on yet another application, namely, to situations in which a government solves an intelligent model, while (5) if the current model is not rejected, the decision maker formulates policy using the model under the assumption (used to formulate the dynamic programming problem) that he will retain this model forever. Cho and Kasa identify useful mathematical senses in which the same stochastic approximation and large deviations results that pertain to a least-squares learning setup also describe the outcomes of their model-validation setup. 21 For example, so-called 'constant gain' algorithms give rise to convergence in distribution, while estimators whose gains diminish at the proper rates converge almost surely. See Williams (2004) . Marcet and Sargent (1995) study rates of convergence. There are examples in which convergence occurs at a √ T rate, but also examples where convergence occurs markedly more slowly.
design problem by using a misspecified model.
REE or SCE?
Some builders of adaptive models have specified an approximating model to equal a true one, meaning that there exists a value θ o for which f (y
, not just equilibrium ones. This specification prevails in adaptive models in which least squares learning schemes converge to rational expectations equilibria, like those used by Woodford (1990) and Marcet and Sargent (1989b) 
some choices of v, the most that can be hoped for is convergence to an SCE. 
SCE-REE gaps and policy design
Why is a gap between a rational expectations equilibrium and a self-confirming equilibrium important for a macroeconomist? Macroeconomists build models with many small agents and some large agents called governments. It doesn't matter to a small agent that his views may be incorrect views off the equilibrium path. But it can matter very much when a large agent like a government has incorrect views off an equilibrium path because in designing its policy we suppose that a government solves a Ramsey problem in which it contemplates the consequences of off-equilibrium path experiments. Wrong views about off-equilibrium path events shape government policy and the equilibrium path.
As my laboratory, I focus on some historical events that have taught central bankers.
Section 6 summarizes a millenium of monetary theory and experiments that took us to the threshold of the 20th century experiment with fiat currency. Section 7 jumps ahead to the 1960s and 1970s and uses statistical models to describe how the U.S. monetary authorities struggled to understand inflation-unemployment dynamics as they sought to meet their dual mandate of promoting high output growth and low inflation.
Learning monetary policy before and after Ricardo
Central bankers are preoccupied with nominal anchors.
From commodity to token to fiat money
Appendix B describes a 700 year process of theorizing and experimenting that transformed a European commodity money system with many nominal anchors -mint-melt price pairs (i.e., gold or silver points) for full bodied coins of all denominations -to a one nominal anchor system that retained gold points for only one standard full bodied coin and used government-issued convertible token coins and notes for other denominations. 23 After another 100 years, governments abolished the gold points for the standard coin too, leaving the nominal anchor to be the monetary authorities' good intentions and their knowledge of the quantity theory of money. Appendix B notes how a commodity money concealed the quantity theory of money because the gold and silver points made the price level be a low variance, small trend exogenous variable and the money supply be a low variance, small trend endogenous variable. I see a self-confirming equilibrium working here. Eventually, some atypical policy experiments generated data with sufficient variance in price levels and money supplies to reveal the quantity theory to empiricists, a theory that led to Ricardo's proposal and ultimately induced monetary experts like Keynes and Fisher to advocate a well-managed fiat system.
6.2 Two threats to a well managed fiat money system Friedman (1991, pp. 249-252) said that our present fiat money system is historically unprecedented and repeated the warning of Fisher (1926, p.131 ) that "Irredeemable paper money has almost invariably proved a curse to the country employing it" because two obstacles obstruct the path to managing a fiat currency well: (1) political pressures to use fiat money to finance government expenditures, and (2) temptations to exploit a Phillips curve (Friedman (1991, p. 207) ). Learning models have been used to interpret monetary authorities' struggles to understand and avoid these obstacles. Marcet and Nicolini (2003) and Sargent et al. (2006a) constructed adaptive models that focus on Friedman's obstacle 1 and feature private agents'
learning. Those papers both select among rational equilibria and modify their outcomes enough to fit data from big inflations in Latin America. In the remainder of this paper, I focus on statistical models that feature monetary authorities' struggles with Friedman's obstacle 2.
Learning inflation-unemployment dynamics
This section describes three stories about how the U.S. monetary authorities learned about inflation-unemployment dynamics after World War II. These stories accept that a monetary authority can control inflation if it wants. 24 Then why did the U.S. monetary authority allow inflation to rise in the late 1960s and 1970s, and why did it bring inflation down in the 1980s and 1990s? If we assume that its purposes did not change, and that it always disliked inflation and unemployment, then it is natural to focus on changes over time in the monetary authority's understanding of inflation-unemployment dynamics. I'll describe three stories associated with empirical models that feature either temporary or permanent discrepancies between a government's model and a true data generating mechanism.
25
24 Appendix C discusses a monetary policy rules literature that focuses on the gap between the monetary authorities' instruments and inflation outcomes.
25 For testimony that policy authorities in the U.S. are concerned about related issues, see Bernanke (2007) and Mishkin (2007) . See Evans and Honkapohja (2003) , Orphanides and Williams (2005, 2007) , and It is natural to impute popular contemporary models to the government. The 'revisionist history' of the U.S. Phillips curve by King and Watson (1994) mechanism on and off the chosen stochastic monetary policy path, but except in the limit as t → ∞, the government's temporary misestimatesθ t of θ o induce it to misunderstand the consequences of policies that it chooses not to implement. In the third story, the government mixes across submodels with operating characteristics that give very different readings about the consequences of following a no-feedback low inflation policy. Bullard and Mitra (2007) for applications of models of this type to evaluating the stability and performance of alternative monetary policy rules. See Cogley (2005) and Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) for applications to the yield curve.
The (temporary) conquest of U.S. inflation
This story is about generating sufficient variation in the data to allow a government's misspecified model to detect that there is no exploitable trade-off between inflation and unemployment. The only way the government's model lets it discover that there truly is no exploitable tradeoff is for it falsely to infer that there is no tradeoff whatsoever. That imperfection dooms stabilizations of inflation to be temporary.
This story uses specifications f (y 
where U is the unemployment rate, π is the rate of inflation, v is the systematic part of the inflation rate chosen by the monetary authority, w is a 2 × 1 Gaussian random vector with mean zero and identity covariance, and ρ 0 > 0, ρ 1 > 0, where ρ 0 is the natural rate of unemployment and ρ 1 is the slope of the Phillips curve. Through equation (20), which is the aggregate supply curve proposed by Lucas (1973) , the model captures a rational expectations version of the natural unemployment rate hypothesis that asserts that the systematic component of inflation v does not affect the distribution of the unemployment rate conditional on v. The government's one-period loss function is E(U 2 + π 2 ).
The government's approximating model denies the natural rate hypothesis by asserting that v affects the probability distribution of U according to
where the random vectorw has the same distribution as w. Under the true model and the timing protocol that the government chooses target inflation before the private sector sets its expectation of inflation, the government's best policy is v = 0. However, under the approximating model (22)- (23), the government's best policy is
There exists a self-confirming equilibrium in which
and (θ 2 ) o = ρ 2 , (θ 3 ) o = ρ 3 . The self-confirming equilibrium equals the time-consistent equilibrium of Kydland and Prescott (1977) . 28 An adaptive government's estimatesθ t converge to the self-confirming equilibrium vector θ o , and the systematic part of inflation converges
The data-matching restriction (25) pinpoints how the government mistakenly ignores the effect of its policy choice v, which equals the public's expected rate of inflation, on the position of the Phillips curve. If v were generated randomly with enough variance, then even though it fits the wrong model, the government would estimate a Phillips curve slope θ 1 of approximately zero and according to (24) would set v approximately to its optimal value 28 The same suboptimal outcome occurs, but for a different reason than the inferior timing protocol isolated by Kydland and Prescott (1977) . Here the source of sub optimality of the government's choice originates in its misunderstanding of the economic structure. The timing protocol is such that if the government knew the correct model, it would attain what Stokey (1989) calls a Ramsey outcome.
of 0 under the true model. But within an SCE, v doesn't vary enough for the government to estimate a θ 1 close enough to zero for that to happen. Furthermore, the outcome that θ t → θ o means that the variation of v t that occurs along transient paths converging to an SCE is insufficient to allow the government's model to approximate the data in a way that tells it to implement the optimal policy under the true model.
However, that is not the end of the story because the adaptive model's endogenous stochastic dynamics occasionally make v vary enough for the government to discover a version of the natural rate hypothesis that is too strong because it mistakenly asserts that there is no tradeoff whatsoever between π and U . The adaptive system is destined to experience recurrent episodes in which 'a most likely unlikely' sequence of w's lowers the unconditional correlation between U and π, which altersθ t in ways that induce the government to push v t below its self-confirming value.
29 That generates data that further weakens the unconditional correlation between inflation and unemployment and movesθ t in a direction that drives v even lower. The ultimate destination of this 'escape' from a self-confirming equilibrium is that the government estimates that θ 1 is 0, prompting it to set v t at the optimal value 0.
These escapes are more likely when the government's estimator (16) discounts past data more heavily, for example, by using a so-called constant gain algorithm. An escape is temporary because the mean dynamics that drive the system toward the SCE vector θ o are bound to reassert themselves and push inflation back toward the suboptimal SCE value of h(θ o ). If this is a good parable for the Volcker-Greenspan stabilization, we should be worried.
Details
Simulations of Sims (1988) generated sample paths that seemed promising for explaining a Volcker-like stabilization prompted by the government's ability to learn a good enough version of the natural rate hypothesis. However, formal econometric attempts to implement the model by Chung (1990) and Sargent (1999) failed to fit the U.S. data well, mainly because 29 That unlikely events occur in the most likely way is a key aspect of large deviation theory. See Cho et al. (2002) for an elaboration of 'most likely unlikely' sequences of shocks. the government's adaptive algorithm catches on to the adverse shifts in Phillips curve so quickly in the early 1970s. Sargent et al. (2006b) replaced the constant gain algorithm used in the earlier models with a Bayesian updating procedure implied by a drifting coefficients model with covariance matrix V for the innovations in the drifts to the coefficients. By estimating V along with the parameters of nature's model by maximum likelihood, they reverse engineered a drifting set of government beliefs that, when put into the Phelps problem each period, produce a sequence of first period Phelps policy recommendations that do a good job of matching the actual inflation data. The estimated V implies that the intercept in the Fed's model is quite volatile and thus makes contact with descriptions of Arthur Burns's Fed, which according to Hetzel (1998) , attributed much of the inflation of the 1970s to special factors akin to dummy variables that capture intercept drift in regressions. More generally, the large estimated V conveys the image of a government that expects coefficients to drift so much that it discounts past data heavily. The model's conjuring up a Fed that over fits its models to recent data is food for thought for Fed watchers. The synthesized government beliefs succeed in rationalizing inflation ex post as a response to these government beliefs, and the beliefs themselves do a good job of forecasting inflation, thus capturing what seems to have been a remarkably good record of inflation forecasting by the Fed (see Bernanke (2007) ). 
Best of all possible worlds?
In the preceding story, policy choices recurrently revisit ones that are optimal under the correct model, but they don't stay there because the mean dynamics attracting them to the suboptimal SCE are destined to reassert themselves. Thus, this story at best only temporarily supports the optimism expressed by Sims (1988) that the government's misspecified 30 But relative to available alternatives, the imputed beliefs do a poor job of forecasting unemployment, a deficiency of the model that hints that the reverse-engineering exercise may be imputing unrealistic views about joint inflation-unemployment dynamics to the Phelps problem in order to rationalize observed inflation outcomes. By conditioning estimates on greenbook forecasts, Carboni and Ellison (2007) repair this deficiency and also reduce the estimated V while leaving the basic story intact. model can approximate the lack of an exploitable U − π tradeoff well enough to induce the government to do what would be the right thing if it actually knew the true model. For the misspecified model to reveal the lack of a tradeoff, the government has to induce adequate variation in inflation, which it does not do within an SCE. So the first story stops short of being one in which evolution converges to 'the best of all possible worlds.' However, a more optimistic outcome prevails in our next story, which endows the government with a model that allows its misunderstandings of off-equilibrium-path choices eventually to vanish.
A Keynesian account
The previous story is about how the troublesome possibility raised in subsection 4.2 plays out. The model of Primiceri (2006) Solow (1968) and Tobin (1968) . 32 Primiceri assumes that a fraction of agents form expectations this way and the rest have rational expectations. Primiceri's specification imposes that the sum of weights on lagged inflation equals unity. Lucas (1972a) and Sargent (1971) argued that, except in a special case, the sum of the weights on lagged inflation being one is not a valid characterization of the natural rate hypothesis. See King and Watson (1994) and Sargent (1999 Sargent ( ). 1960 Sargent ( 1965 Sargent ( 1970 Sargent ( 1975 Sargent ( 1980 Sargent ( 1985 Sargent ( 1990 Sargent ( 1995 Sargent ( 2000 Sargent ( 5 6 7 (a) 1960 Sargent ( 1965 Sargent ( 1970 Sargent ( 1975 Sargent ( 1980 Sargent ( 1985 Sargent ( 1990 Sargent ( 1995 government policy instrument v t affects current and future gaps between the unemployment rate u t and a natural rate of unemployment u N t ;
33 and (iv) a one-period government loss
2 where π * is a target rate of inflation andû N t is the government's estimate of natural unemployment rate. The model allows the government's misperception of the natural rate to influence policy, as advocated by Orphanides (2002 Orphanides ( , 2003 . It also allows other potentially important government misperceptions to influence policy.
Primiceri's maximum likelihood estimates succeed in accounting for the acceleration of inflation in the 1960s and 1970s, then the fall in the 1980s in terms of the government's initial underestimates of the natural unemployment rate as well as a temporal pattern of underestimates of the persistence of inflation and overestimates of the costs of disinflation coming from its estimated inflation-unemployment tradeoff.
34 Figure 1 reproduces Feature (ii) of Primiceri's model embraces a Keynesian spirit of assuming that the authority influences output directly through the aggregate demand function, then inflation indirectly through the expectationsaugmented Phillips curve. Contrast this with the classical specification adopted by Sims (1988) , Chung (1990) , Sargent (1999) , Cho et al. (2002) , and Sargent et al. (2006b) . 34 Primiceri calibrates initial government beliefs by using data between 1948 and 1960 to estimate the model's parameters.
35 These calibrated beliefs feature a level of persistence of inflation in the Phillips curve that is much lower than what prevails in the estimated model's self-confirming equilibrium. In addition to ure II, which shows his estimates of the evolution of the Fed's estimates of the natural rate of unemployment, the persistence inflation, and the slope of the Phillips curve. The Phelps problem attributes the acceleration of inflation to the monetary authority's initial underestimates of both the natural rate and the persistence of inflation. A lower estimated persistence of inflation indicates to the government that mean reverting inflation will evaporate soon enough on its own, making a less anti-inflationary policy emerge from the Phelps problem. After inflation had risen, the Phelps problem attributes the monetary authority's reluctance to deflate to its overestimation of the costs of disinflation as captured by the slope of the Phillips curve. We will return to this point in subsection 7.3, where we link it to the conceptual issues about direction of fit raised by King and Watson (1994) .
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Under-estimates of the natural unemployment rate and over-estimates of the sacrifice ratio are connected. When the Fed under-estimates the natural rate and over-estimates the unemployment gap, it over-predicts the amount of disinflation. That causes it to revise its estimate of the slope of the Phillips curve towards zero. Thus, Orphanides's story about the consequences of missestimating the natural rate of unemployment complements Primiceri's story about sacrifice ratio pessimism.
An eclectic account
The stories in the previous two sections take stands on what both the true and the government's approximating models are. Cogley and Sargent (2005) perform an exercise that does not require specifying a true data generating mechanism, the empirical distribution being enough. But the government's views about policy choices not made play a key role. The government's model f (y ∞ , v ∞ |θ) mixes three submodels with Bayesian posterior probabilities these initial conditions, Primiceri sets two constant gain parameters, one for the natural rate, another for all other coefficients in the government's beliefs. These calibrated objects, the data, and the parameters of the structural relations pin down the government's beliefs. Primiceri uses maximum likelihood to estimate parameters appearing in the government's objective function and the time-invariant structural equations. 36 Among many interesting features of Primiceri's results are his estimate of k, the parameter in the government's one-period loss function that allows Primiceri to evaluate the government's temptation to deviate from the natural rate (he finds that the temptation is small) and the time series that he extracts for v t , which tracks a real interest rate very well after 1980. that are included in the vectorθ t .
A government entertains three models that Cogley and Sargent use to capture prominent specifications from the literature about U.S. unemployment-inflation dynamics described by King and Watson (1994) . The models are (1) The government starts with a prior with non-zero weights on all three models in 1960, estimates each sub model using Bayesian methods, and updates its prior over the three sub models.
37 In each period, the government solves a Phelps problem that penalizes inflation and unemployment and that uses its time t submodel probabilities to average over its time Cogley et al. (2007b) for a related setup that has only two submodels, each of which has known coefficients, and in which the government designs purposeful experiments because it includes the submodel probabilities in the state vector. By way of contrast, the model being discussed in the text has the government making decisions as if its temporary mixture of models will prevail forever and therefore excludes purposeful experimentation. Cogley et al. (2007a) study purposeful experimentation when a government trusts neither its submodels nor its Bayesian posterior over submodels. 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Figures 2 and 3 taken from Cogley and Sargent (2005) frame the following puzzles. By 38 We have to put positive probabilities on the yet-to-be invented models in 1960 in order to launch our story. Foster and Young (2003) introduce new models randomly while having only one model being used to guide decisions at any moment. 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 the early 1970s, the data had moved the government's prior to put probability approaching 1 on the Lucas model that recommends zero inflation (see figure 2) . Why nevertheless was actual inflation so high and variable in the 1970s? And why was the systematic part of inflation that emerges from the Phelps problem (see figure 3 ) even higher and more variable?
Why did the Phelps planner discount the recommendations of the Lucas model despite its high posterior probability?
The answer is to be found in what the Samuelson-Solow and Solow-Tobin models say would happen if the Lucas zero-target-inflation policy were to be adopted (see figure 4) .
The Phelps problem weights the submodel posterior probabilities against losses associated with various off-taken-path recommendations. In the early 1970s, their Keynesian direction of fit moved the coefficients in those submodels in ways that pointed to very high sacrifice ratios. Despite their low posterior probabilities, those models implied very high expected discounted losses if the Lucas policy recommendation were to be implemented immediately.
In contrast, the high-probability Lucas model implied less adverse consequences if the recommendations of the Samuelson-Solow or Solow-Tobin models were allowed to prevail. So the Cogley and Sargent story is that the Lucas model's policy recommendation did not prevail in the 1970s because there remained a low probability that it would be disastrous. In order for a low-inflation recommendation to emerge from the Phelps problem, the estimated coef-ficients in the Samuelson-Solow and Solow-Tobin models had to adjust in ways that would moderate the consequences of a low-inflation policy. That happened by the mid 1980s.
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The direction-of-fit issue discussed by King and Watson (1994) by Cogley and Sargent (2005, p. 546-547) . The sacrifice ratios differ so much across submodels because of how the submodels interpret the diminished, near-zero contemporaneous covariance between inflation and unemployment that had emerged by the mid 1970s. In a Keynesian Phillips curve, this diminished covariance flattens the short-term tradeoff, making the authorities believe that a long spell of high unemployment would be needed to bring inflation down, prompting Keynesian modelers to be less inclined to disinflate. But for a classical Phillips curve, the shift toward a zero covariance steepens the short-term tradeoff, making the authorities believe that inflation could be reduced at less cost in terms of higher unemployment. Thus, a classically-oriented policy maker was more inclined to disinflate.
39 The data also indicate that Bayes' law sponsors comebacks for the Samuelson-Solow and Solow-Tobin models in the 1980s and 1990s. One reaction that a true believer in the Lucas model might have is that Bayes' law is just too forgiving in still putting positive probability on those other models after the early 1970s data had come in, and that the inflation problem of the 1970s would have been solved by driving a stake through those other models. But no one has the authority to drive stakes, and models with operating characteristics much like those two survive today. The dispute between the fallacious (according to Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 191) ) real bills doctrine and the quantity theory of money is mottled with repeated episodes having one of these doctrines being disposed of in favor of the other, then the other making a comeback. The real bills doctrine rides high in times like these when the Fed pegs a short term interest rate.
Lessons about inflation targeting
Each of our stories about post WWII U.S. inflation features a government loss function that weights both unemployment and inflation, thereby taking seriously the "dual mandate" that the Full Employment Act of 1946 and the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 (Humphrey-Hawkins) convey to the Fed. If they had assumed that the government one-period loss function is π 2 instead of (U 2 + π 2 ), 40 then none of our stories could have gotten off the ground. Despite the different imperfections in the approximating models they attribute to the monetary authority, all of the models would have the monetary authority always set target inflation to zero and be indifferent to the accompanying unemployment outcome. Each of our three stories thus contains a justification for inflation targeting as a device that compensates for model misspecification.
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Inflation-unemployment outcomes after WWII have caused many countries to adjust what they expect from monetary policy by mandating inflation targeting. The outcome of decades of experiences with fiat money partly reflects extensive cross-country copying and partly a widespread belief that monetary authorities don't have good enough models to do more. When we have asked the monetary authorities for more, we usually got less.
Concluding remarks
It is easy to agree with a warning by Sims (1980) that leaving the rational expectations equilibrium concept sends us into a "wilderness" because there is such a bewildering variety of ways to imagine discrepancies between objective and subjective distributions. 42 For this reason, relative to some models of learning in games (see appendix A), the adaptive models
Here the reason for assigning an inflation target to the monetary authority is to prevent it from doing what it might want to do because it has a misspecified model, in contrast to the reasoning of Rogoff (1985) , in which the justification for strategic delegation is to prevent a monetary authority from doing what it is tempted to do when it has a correct model but a timing protocol that presents temptations to deviate from superior policies that could be attained under a timing protocol that enables it to precommit.
42 There is an infinite number of ways to be wrong, but only one way to be correct.
described in this paper are cautious modifications of rational expectations theories and rational expectations econometrics. The timidity of my departure from rational expectations reflects a desire to retain much of the discipline of rational expectations econometrics. I have focused on some of the things that can happen when a government solves an intelligent design problem while using a misspecified model. I view the very simple statistical models in section 7 as parables that capture the situation that we are always in, namely, that our probability models are misspecified.
43 By stressing the possibility that learning has propelled us to a self-confirming equilibrium in which the government chooses an optimal policy based on a wrong model, the learning literature changes how we should think about generating the novel data sets and policies that will allow misguided governments to break out of the lack-of-experimentation traps to which self-confirming equilibria confine them.
It is also easy to admire the sprit of the quote from Ricardo. It conveys respect for the struggles of our predecessors and the monetary institutions that they created, and confidence that, armed with new models and technologies, we can do better.
Appendixes
A Learning in games
In a game, a Nash equilibrium is the natural counterpart of a rational expectations equilibrium or a recursive competitive equilibrium. An extensive literature studies whether a system of adaptive players converges to a Nash equilibrium. A range of plausible adaptive algorithms have been proposed that are differentiated by how much foresight and theorizing they attribute to the players. 44 At one extreme are adaptive models that have naive players who ignore strategic interactions and either play against histograms of their opponents past actions (this is called fictitious play) or alter their moves in directions that ex post reduce their regret at not having taken other actions in the past, given their opponents' histories of actions. At the other extreme are models in which players construct statistical theories about their opponents' behavior, use them for a while to make forward-looking decisions, occasionally subject their theories to hypothesis tests, discard rejected ones and choose new specifications.
This literature has sought plausible and robust algorithms that converge to a Nash equilibrium. Hart and Mas-Colell say that this is a tall order:
It is notoriously difficult to formulate sensible adaptive dynamics that guarantee convergence to Nash equilibrium. In fact, short of variants of exhaustive search (deterministic or stochastic), there are no general results. Hart and Mas-Colell (2003, p. 1830) Hart and Mas-Colell and Foster and Vohra (1999) show that the source of the difficulty is that most adaptive schemes specify that adjustments in a player's strategy do not depend on other players' payoff functions, an uncoupling of the dynamics that in general prevents the system from converging to a Nash equilibrium. Many examples of the adaptive schemes in the literature are uncoupled. Because many game theorists find uncoupled schemes desirable, parts of the literature have lowered the bar by looking for convergence to something weaker than Nash equilibria, namely, correlated equilibria or coarse correlated equilibria. Hart and Mas-Colell (2003, p. 1834) observed that "It is thus interesting that Nash equilibrium, a notion that does not predicate coordinated behavior, cannot be guaranteed to be reached in an uncoupled way, while correlated equilibrium, a notion based on coordination, can." 45 Hart and Mas-Colell (2000 study adaptive schemes that are backward looking. For example, some of the most interesting ones have a player construct counterfactual historical payoffs that he would have received had he played other strategies, then compute 44 For a critical survey of this literature, see Young (2004) . 45 Experimental economics has supplied data sets designed to check ideas from the literature on adaptive learning in games. Laboratory experiments using macroeconomics are rarer than those using microeconomics. See Duffy (2006) for an account of the existing experiments. I suspect that the main reason for fewer experiments in macro than in micro is that the choices confronting artificial agents within even one of the simpler recursive competitive equilibria used in macroeconomics are very complicated relative to the settings with which experimentalists usually confront subjects. a measure of regret, then adjust future play in directions that would have minimized regret. These schemes impute little or no theorizing and foresight to the players.
For my present purposes, one of the most interesting contributions comes from part of the literature that attributes more sophistication to players, in particular, the work of Foster and Young (2003) , which is also summarized in Young (2004, ch. 8) .
46 Their model has the following components: (1) each player has a large set of potential models that describe his opponents' strategies; (2) players use a random device to select a particular model; (3) after that model is selected, there is an 'act and collect data' period during which a player (incorrectly) assumes that he will believe his current model forever; during this period, each player chooses his actions via a smoothed best response to what his model tells him about opponents' actions (e.g., a quantal response function); (4) after a data collection period, a player compares the empirical pattern of his opponents' play with that predicted by his model. He performs an hypothesis test that compares the theoretical and empirical distributions. If he rejects his current model, he randomly draws a new model from his set of models, then returns to step 2. If he accepts the model, he returns to step 3, waits a random number of periods, and then begins another data collection period.
With suitable assumptions about the lengths of testing periods and the tolerances of the hypothesis tests, Foster and Young (2003) show that behaviors eventually emerge that are often close to Nash equilibria. Their notion of hypothesis tests is sufficiently broad to include many plausible procedures. Their convergence result seems to be an uncoupled multi-agent learning scheme that actually approaches Nash equilibria, not something weaker like the coarse correlated equilibrium that the entirely backward-looking schemes mentioned above can approach. They avoid the conundrum of Hart and Mas-Colell partly by weakening the notion of convergence.
B From commodity to fiat money
A long process led to the ideas in the opening quote from David Ricardo, which in time led Keynes and others to propose a fiat currency.
B.1 Learning to supplement a commodity currency with tokens Redish (1990 Redish ( , 2000 and Sargent and Velde (2002) described how it took 800 years to understand and cope with two imperfections that marred an ideal self-regulating commodity money system in which coins of all denominations were meant to exchange at values proportional to their silver (or gold) content. In the ideal system, a government instructed a mint to offer to sell coins of different denominations for precious metal at prices proportional to their weights in precious metal. The mint did not buy coins for metal, but citizens were free to melt precious metal coins to recover precious metal. If minting and melting were costless, this self-regulating system would automatically adjust the denomination structure of coins to suit coin holders' preferences by letting them melt coins of a denomination they wanted less of, then take the metal to the mint to buy coins of the denomination they wanted. 47 In the ideal system, a metal melt point equaled a metal mint point, denomination by denomination.
In practice, two imperfections hampered this system: (1) it was costly to produce coins; and (2) coins depreciated through wear and tear and sweating and clipping. The first imperfection gave rise to nonempty intervals between melt and mint points for gold or silver coins of each denomination -an upper point that indicated a melting point for that coin and a lower one that prompted minting. The proportionate spreads between minting and melting points differed because as a fraction of the value of the coin, it was cheaper to produce a large denomination coin than a small denomination coin. Unless the government were to subsidize the mint for producing low denomination coins, the spread between minting and melting points would be proportionately wider for low denomination coins. The second imperfection allowed underweight coins to circulate along side full weight coins.
A nonempty interval between melting and minting points allowed coins to circulate by tale (i.e., by what is written on the coin rather than by weight) at an exchange value that exceeded their value by weight. Indeed, in the presence of costs of producing coins, the money supply mechanism provided incentives for people to purchase new coins from the mint only when their value in exchange exceeded their value by weight by enough to cover the mint's brassage and seigniorage fees (Smith 1789, Book I, ch. 5) .
Nonempty intervals with proportionately wider widths for lower denomination coins and a consequent exchange rate indeterminacy allowed the intervals to shift over time and eventually to become so misaligned that they recurrently provided incentives to melt small denomination coins. That created the recurring shortages of small coins documented by Cipolla (1956 Cipolla ( , 1982 .
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Cipolla (1956) described a temporary practical remedy for these shortages. The authorities debased small denomination coins, thereby shifting their mint-melt intervals in a direction that motivated citizens to purchase new coins from the mint. Monetary authorities throughout Europe used this method for hundreds of years. There were repeated debasements in small denomination silver coins and secular declines in rates of exchange of small denomination for large denomination coins.
Many experiments, some inadvertent, others purposeful, were performed, and numerous theoretical tracts were written and disputed before what Cipolla (1956) called the 'standard formula' for issuing token small denomination coins was put into practice in the mid 19th century.
49 It solved the problem of misaligned mint-melt intervals for coins of different denominations by, first, having only one large denomination full weight coin that the mint sold for a precious metal, and, second, having the government issue difficult-to-counterfeit small denomination token coins that it promised to convert on demand into the large denomination coin. This required a technology for manufacturing coins that were difficult to counterfeit.
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47 Sargent and Velde (2002, p. 95) cited Bernando Davanzati, who in 1588 wrote that "metal should be worth as much in bullion as in coin, and be able to change from metal to money and money to metal without loss, like an amphibious animal."
48 This multi-interval commodity money system in which coins circulate by tale is taken for granted by Smith (1789, book I, ch. 5) .
49 This process of shuttling through experiments, reformulations of theories, and further experiments reminds me of the hypothesis-testing learning models of Foster and Young (2003) and Cho and Kasa (2006) , but I might be imagining things.
50 See Redish (1990 Redish ( , 2000 and Selgin (2003) .
As examples of inadvertent experiments, token monies were occasionally issued inside besieged cities and sometimes they worked. A document that anticipated ideas of John Law, Adam Smith, and David Ricardo sparked a purposeful experiment. It advised King Ferdinand II of Spain that he could issue token copper coins that Spanish residents would voluntarily accept from the government in exchange for full-bodied silver coins. It described how this fiscal boon to the Spanish treasury could be attained in a noninflationary way.
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Three successive Spanish Kings tried this experiment, which had all of the ingredients of the 19th century standard formula except convertibility. For 25 years, the experiment worked well, yielding the government substantial revenues without inflation. But eventually excessive issues of copper coins caused inflation, in the aftermath of which the Spanish monetary authorities pursued a fascinating sequence of experiments. They repeatedly restamped copper coins and manipulated the unit of account in order either to adjust the price level or raise revenues for the Spanish government.
The quantity theory can operate only in the limited interval between the mint and melt points for a precious metal, so a commodity money system conceals the quantity theory. When the Spanish broke through those restrictions, they gave the British statistician Sir William Petty data that he used to discover a quantity theory of money (see Hull (1899) ). Other episodes created more data that further substantiated the quantity theory of money, for example, the construction and collapse of John Law's system (see Velde (2007) ) and the overissuing of French assignats after the sales of the church lands that had initially backed them were suspended when war broke out in 1792 (see Sargent and Velde (1995) ). But the same episodes that lent vivid empirical support to a quantity theory also brought evidence that government monetary authorities could not be trusted to administer a pure fiat standard in ways that stabilized prices.
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In 1660, the master of the British mint, Henry Slingsby, added an element missing from the Spanish experiment, namely, convertibility of token coins, and recommended what in the 19th century became the standard formula.
53 But perhaps because the inflation accompanying the Spanish and similar experiments had given token coins a bad name, the British government ignored Slingsby's recommendations. Many experts, including Locke (1691), continued to insist that token coins of any denomination were dangerous and that a good faith commodity money system required that coins of all denominations be full bodied. For a long time, that sentiment convinced national governments not to issue tokens, but other entities created them. In seventeenth and eighteenth century Britain, hundreds of private firms and municipalities issued small denomination tokens that formed a substantial part of the country's coinage. Between 1816 and 1836, the British government implemented the standard formula by nationalizing a token coin industry that had long existed.
51 See the document cited in Sargent and Velde (2002, pp. 231-232) . 52 I suspect that is why later advocates for replacing the gold standard with 'more scientific' systems of managed currencies including Adam Smith and Ricardo to Keynes purposefully omitted references to some of the historical experiments that generated the data that were sources for the quantity theory of money. For example, Smith (1789) did not cite John Law's theoretical writings as among the sources for his monetary recommendations.
53 See Sargent and Velde (2002, pp. 268-269) .
B.2 Ricardo's proposal
It required 156 years to take the short logical step from Slingsby's 1660 standard formula for issuing convertible token subsidiary coins to David Ricardo's 1816 recommendation. Ricardo proposed that a country's domestic money supply should ideally consist of paper notes that the government promises to exchange at a pegged price for gold bullion bars, but that no gold coins should actually be minted. A variant of Ricardo's scheme in which a government promises to redeem domestic notes for gold, but only for foreign residents, came to be practiced around 1900. This arrangement, by which "a cheap local currency [is] artificially maintained at par with the international standard of value," (Keynes 1913, p. 25) was called the "gold exchange standard." Keynes described how by 1913 this system had come to prevail in India through a sequence of haphazard administrative decisions that eventually produced a coherent system that no one had planned but that Keynes applauded. Keynes (1913, p. 25) predicted that Ricardo's scheme would be an essential part of "the ideal currency system of the future."
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The standard formula eliminates the gold or silver points for all but one standard coin, uses the mint and melt points for that coin to regulate the total quantity of money, and promises freely to convert tokens into that standard coin in order to produce the correct denomination composition. It was one more step from the standard formula or Ricardo's proposal to the recommendation of Fisher (1920) , Keynes, and others that well intentioned government officials, not the mint and melt points for a standard coin, should regulate the supply of money. Discovering the quantity theory of money was an essential step in learning the conditions under which a fiat money system could be managed to provide greater price level stability than could be achieved with a gold standard.
As Keynes wanted, in the twentieth century governments throughout the world carried out the historically unprecedented experiment of managing currencies completely cut off from gold backing (see Friedman (1991, p. 245) ). Figure 5 documents that, at least until very recently, the monetary authorities in four hard-currency countries failed to deliver the kind of price stability that a commodity standard had achieved. There was much more inflation in many other countries.
C A monetary policy rules literature
The adaptive models described in section 7 explain the rise and fall of post WWII U.S. inflation in terms of monetary policy rules that drifted in response to drifts in the monetary authorities' models of the economy. All three models embed very crude descriptions of the monetary policy rules and sidestep many interesting questions about monetary policy 54 Speaking of how a change in Indians' preferences for holding gold could cause world-wide inflation in prices:
The time may not be far distant when Europe, having perfected her mechanism of exchange on the basis of a gold standard, will find it possible to regulate her standard of value on a more rational and stable basis. It is not likely that we shall leave permanently the most intimate adjustments of our economic organism at the mercy of a lucky prospector, a new chemical process, or a change of ideas [preferences for holding gold] in Asia. (Keynes 1913, p. 71) Figure 5: Indices of prices in terms of unit of account in England, the United States, France, and Spain. Sargent and Velde (2002, p. 35) transmission mechanisms. It is appropriate to say a few words about a related literature that uses time series data to infer the structure of post WWII U.S. monetary policy rules and how they have changed over time. The bottom line is that this literature has mixed evidence about whether monetary policy rules shifted enough to validate stories along the lines of our three adaptive models.
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Bernanke and Mihov (1998) developed an SVAR methodology for measuring innovations in monetary policy and their macroeconomic effects. They compared alternative ways of measuring monetary policy shocks and derived a new measure of policy innovations based on possibly time-varying estimates of the Fed's operating procedures. They presented a measure of the overall stance of policy (see Bernanke and Mihov (1998, Fig. III, p. 899) ) that is striking in how the distribution of tight and loose policies seems not to have changed much in the periods before and after 1980.
But Clarida et al. (2000) estimated a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function for the postwar United States economy before and after Volcker's appointment as Fed Chairman in 1979 and found substantial differences across periods. They found that interest rate policy in the Volcker-Greenspan period has been much more sensitive to changes in expected inflation than in the pre-Volcker period. They then extracted implications of the estimated rules for the equilibrium properties of inflation and output in a new Keynesian DSGE model and showed that the Volcker-Greenspan rule is stabilizing, but that the earlier rule was not. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) estimated a new Keynesian model like Clarida et al.'s in which the equilibrium is undetermined if monetary policy is passive. They constructed posterior weights for the determinacy and indeterminacy region of the parameter space as well as estimates for the propagation of fundamental and sunspot shocks. They found that U.S. monetary policy after 1982 was consistent with determinacy but that the pre-Volcker policy was not, and also that before 1979 indeterminacy substantially altered the propagation of shocks.
In contrast, working in terms of less completely interpreted models, Sims and Zha (2006) estimated a multivariate regime-switching model for monetary policy and found that the best fit allows time variation in disturbance variances only. When they permitted the systematic VAR coefficients to change, the best fit was with change only in the monetary policy rule. They estimated three regimes that correspond to periods across which the folk-wisdom states that monetary policy differed. But they found that those differences among regimes were not large enough to account for the rise and decline of inflation of the 1970s and 1980s. Likewise, by estimating a time-varying VAR with stochastic volatility, Primiceri (2005) found that both the systematic and non-systematic components of monetary policy had changed. In particular, he found that the systematic responses of the interest rate to inflation and unemployment exhibited a trend toward more aggressive behavior, while also having sizeable high frequency oscillations. But Primiceri concluded that those had small effects on the rest of the economy and that exogenous non-policy shocks were more important than interest rate policy in explaining the U.S. inflation and unemployment episodes of the 1970's, thus coming down more on the 'bad luck' than the 'bad policies' side of the argument. I hope that conclusion is too pessimistic because we have learned to do better.
